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Abstract
It has long been recognized that many late medieval bishops were heavily involved in
secular government. Scholars have tended to characterize these activities in fairly
general terms, labelling those who chose to serve the crown as ‘administrators’, ‘bureau-
crats’ or ‘civil servants’. In fact, they are better described as king’s judges, for a large
part of what bishops did in government was dispensing justice in the king’s name. The
first part of this article explores the contexts of this judicial activity, showing that
bishops were especially active in institutions such as parliament, chancery and the
council which offered justice to the king’s subjects on a discretionary basis. Discretion-
ary justice was closely informed by the precepts of natural law, which in turn derived
authority from the abstract notion of the divine will. The second half of the article
suggests that the strong theological underpinning of discretionary justice meant that
bishops’ involvement in secular government did not stand in opposition to their spiritual
vocation or their role as leaders of the church. I argue that the sweeping and rather
disparaging contemporary and modern characterizations of ‘civil-servant’ bishops as
self-serving careerists ought to be replaced by a more nuanced understanding of the
rationale and motivation of those senior clergymen who involved themselves in secular
governance.
In 1418 the prior of Bath presented a bill to the chancellorcomplaining about the noise and disturbance caused by the ringingof parish bells at the behest of the mayor and citizens of the town of
Bath.1 He claimed that this was in contravention of a long-held custom
which ordained that the bells of the priory cathedral church ought to
have precedence over the town and that no other bells should sound
between the curfew and the first ringing of the cathedral bells the next
morning. The difficulties faced by the prior and monks of the Benedictine
monastery were especially acute because the bells of the parish church
were said to sound louder in the cathedral than in the parish churches
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themselves. Indeed, such was the cacophony of noise that the monks
claimed that they were prevented from performing their divine service.
This case has obvious interest as an early example of the more modern
phenomenon of ‘noisy neighbours’, but there was probably more at stake
for the monks of Bath than the peace and tranquillity of their early
morning masses, for bell-ringing was an important symbol of authority
and prestige, and could be used to demarcate (and overstep) lines of
authority.2
For our purposes, however, the importance of the dispute lies in the
role of the episcopate in bringing the warring parties to terms. The initial
petition was sent to Thomas Langley, bishop of Durham, then
chancellor; but he appears to have been ineffective in the matter.3 The
real peacemaker was Nicholas Bubwith, bishop of Bath and Wells. As a
result of his mediation, the ‘bell-wars’ of Bath came to an end and peace,
in all senses of the word, was restored: in return for supplying candles to
the cathedral, the citizens of Bath were permitted to sound their bells
throughout the day, but they were strictly forbidden to ring before six in
the morning, thus giving the monks the respite they so desperately
sought.4 The resolution of the dispute by Bishop Bubwith nicely
illustrates the mediating role of bishops in difficult and often protracted
local conflicts in late medieval England. There are obvious reasons why
Bubwith should have been involved in this episode, since the city of Bath
was part of his diocese and the dispute related to matters of a broadly
ecclesiastical nature;5 but the case itself had initially been brought to the
attention of the crown, and Bubwith himself was functioning, in essence,
as the agent of the king in seeking a resolution to the problem. Acting
in this way, as a judge-delegate of the king, Bubwith was working
in accordance with a tradition that had long seen members of
the episcopacy fulfil quasi-jurisdictional functions on behalf of the
state. It is a role which, though recognized in the late Middle Ages, has
never received direct or full consideration. For the most part, studies
investigating how late medieval bishops acted as the agents of the crown
have concentrated on their activities as the raisers of taxation,6 the
propagators of war propaganda,7 and/or the political supporters or
2 Ibid., p. xxxvii.
3 For the commission issued to the chancellor charging him to resolve the dispute, see Calendar of
Signet Letters of Henry IV and Henry V (1399–1422) (London, 1978), nos. 811 and 843; Calendar
of Patent Rolls [hereafter CPR], 1416–22, p. 205.
4 T. Scott Holmes (ed.), Register of Nicholas Bubwith, Bishop of Bath and Wells, 1407–1424,
Somerset Record Society, 29 (1914), pp. 460–4, no. 1266.
5 W. Page (ed.), The Victoria County History of Somerset (10 vols; London, repr. 1969), II,
pp. 70–1.
6 For example, A. Rogers, ‘Clerical taxation under Henry IV’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical
Research, 46 (1973), pp. 123–44; A. K. McHardy, ‘Clerical taxation in fifteenth-century England:
the clergy as agents of the Crown’, in R. B. Dobson (ed.), The Church, Politics and Patronage in the
Fifteenth Century (Gloucester, 1984), pp. 160–92.
7 For example, W. R. Jones, ‘The English Church and royal propaganda during the Hundred
Years War’, Journal of British Studies, 19 (1979–80), pp. 18–30; A. K. McHardy, ‘Some reflections
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opponents of the king.8 Moreover, on questions of legal process, and
more generally of jurisdictional identity, historians have tended to cast
the church and state in oppositional terms. It is a view informed by an
implicit assumption that bishops were interested only in the operation of
canon law in the ecclesiastical courts, and had little interest in the
workings of the common law and other lay jurisdictional contexts, other
than to defend their ecclesiastical interests from royal encroachment.9
In fact, there was no theoretical basis why bishops could not admin-
ister justice in a secular context, providing these judicial activities did
not involve the shedding of Christian blood.10 Before the mid-thirteenth
century the king sometimes appointed bishops as his senior judges, or
more commonly, he chose some bishops from a pool of clerks who were
professional judges serving on the bench and/or eyre.11 Admittedly,
from this point onwards, the clergy were increasingly sidelined, as a
professional class of lawyers emerged to take over the running of the
on Edward III’s use of propaganda’, in J. S. Bothwell (ed.), The Age of Edward III (Woodbridge,
2001), pp. 171–92.
8 For example, K. Edwards, ‘The political importance of the English Bishops during the reign of
Edward II’, English Historical Review, 59 (1944), pp. 311–47; R. G. Davies, ‘The episcopate and the
political crisis in England of 1386–1388’, Speculum, 51 (1976), pp. 659–93; R. L. Storey, ‘Episcopal
king-makers in the fifteenth century’, in Dobson (ed.), Church, Politics and Patronage, pp. 82–98;
B. Thompson, ‘Prelates and politics from Winchelsey to Warham’, in L. Clark and C. Carpenter
(eds), The Fifteenth Century IV: Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain (Woodbridge, 2004),
pp. 69–95; and, most recently, W. Mark Ormrod, ‘An archbishop in revolt: Richard Scrope and the
Yorkshire Rising of 1405’, in P. J. P. Goldberg (ed.), Richard Scrope: Archbishop, Rebel, Martyr
(Donington, 2007), pp. 28–44.
9 The work of W. R. Jones is of most relevance in this respect: W. R. Jones, ‘Bishops, politics, and
the Two Laws: the Gravamina of the English Clergy, 1237–1399’, Speculum, 41 (1966), pp. 209–45;
idem, ‘The Two Laws in England: the later Middle Ages’, Journal of Church and State, 11 (1969),
pp. 111–31; and idem, ‘Relations of the two jurisdictions: conflict and cooperation in England
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 7
(1970), pp. 79–210.
10 James A. Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and
Courts (Chicago, 2008), pp. 174–9.
11 For example, William de Vere, bishop of Hereford 1186–98 (justice of the eyre 1185, 1186, 1192,
1193 and 1194); Herbert Poore, bishop of Salisbury 1194–1217 (justice of the bench, 1190–7);
Godfrey Lucy, justice of the eyre and of the bench from 1179, becoming bishop of Winchester in
1189; Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, 1205–38 (justiciar, 1213–15); William Raleigh,
justice of the bench from 1229, until made bishop of Norwich in 1239 and later bishop of
Winchester; William of York, justice of the bench from 1231, until made bishop of Salisbury in
1247; Simon of Walton, bishop of Norwich, 1257–66 (noted as chief justice of the bench of
common pleas in 1257); John le Breton, justice of the king’s bench until made bishop of Hereford
in 1269. Biographical details of these individuals can be found in the Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (Oxford, 2004), online edn. For discussion, see J. R. H. Moorman, Church Life in
England in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 164–5; F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland,
The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd edn (2 vols; Cambridge, 1898), I, pp.
131–4; W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (13 vols; London, 1922–35), II, pp. 177, 227;
Ralph V. Turner, Men Raised From Dust: Administrative Service and Upward Mobility in Angevin
England (Philadelphia, 1988), pp. 27, 92–104; and Brundage, Medieval Origins, pp. 73–4. For the
presence of significant numbers of lower-status clerics serving as royal justices in the thirteenth
century, having first found employment in the exchequer and chancery, see F. Pegues, ‘The clericus
in the legal administration of thirteenth-century England’, English Historical Review, 71 (1956),
pp. 529–59, esp. pp. 531–42. The majority of these clerks were in minor orders.
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king’s courts, but in the whole area of prerogative or discretionary
justice – that is to say, cases which fell outside the usual remit of the
common law, and were usually decided not according to preordained
legal code but on the basis of what was considered to be fair and
‘equitable’ – bishops continued to play a crucial and prominent role.
Indeed, as the institutional structures put in place to provide prerogative
justice became more sophisticated, the involvement of bishops in this
vital branch of secular law similarly became more pronounced.
In scholarship, this phenomenon has been most clearly recognized in
the context of the late medieval chancery, which developed into a court of
first instance under the leadership of clerical chancellors in the course of
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Important work has also been
done on the intellectual traditions that underpinned the development
of discretionary justice, and the links that existed between theology,
natural law, and legalistic notions of equity and conscience.12 But there is,
as yet, no broader appreciation of the nature of the judicial activities that
many bishops (and not just clerical chancellors) undertook on behalf of
the crown, nor any attempt to link these activities with the more
theoretical or philosophical framework upon which prerogative or
discretionary jurisdiction hung. This is to some extent explained by the
limited conceptualization in academic work of the term ‘justice’. ‘Justice’
is usually written about in relation to the common law, and ‘judges’ are
usually identified as the men of law who worked in the king’s common
law courts. I adopt a more holistic approach by starting with the premise
that the prerogative or discretionary jurisdiction that operated alongside,
and often in conjunction with, the common law, was as much a
manifestation of royal justice as the legal codes that shaped courts like
the quarter sessions or the king’s bench. I thus describe bishops as king’s
‘judges’ because royal justice was in essence what they were called upon
to exercise, in cases that frequently required evidence to be gathered and
scrutinized, arguments to be weighed, often in the form of solemn
testimony, and a final judgment to be reached in the name of the king.
The aim of this discussion is to establish a more detailed and rounded
picture of how and why bishops were willing to act in this capacity.
I
Bishops exercised discretionary justice in three main institutional
contexts: parliament, the council and chancery. Since chancery developed
its jurisdictional authority rather later than parliament and the council, it
will be considered separately further on in the discussion. It is in
parliament that bishops’ involvement in secular jurisdiction is most
apparent, for bishops headed the lists of triers who were appointed by the
12 See in particular, N. Doe, Fundamental Authority in Late Medieval English Law (Cambridge,
1990).
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king to pass judgment on the numerous private petitions brought to each
assembly for redress.13 Not all bishops who were summoned to
parliament were appointed as triers. This was especially the case in the
first half of the fourteenth century when only a small minority sat on the
committees. In 1341, for example, only four bishops were appointed (i.e.
Durham, Salisbury, Ely and Hereford); in 1354, the bishops of Lincoln,
Rochester, Norwich and Chichester, together with the archbishop of
Canterbury, were included.14 Later in the century, the pattern of
appointment could vary considerably, influenced as it was by the
changeable political climate. In October 1377, for example, during
Richard II’s unofficial minority, no fewer than seventeen members of the
episcopal bench were appointed as triers (only two, in fact, were
omitted).15 By contrast, only three out of fifteen bishops known to have
attended Henry IV’s first parliament of 1399 were involved in hearing
petitions, no doubt because in this parliament attention was fixed on the
tumultuous events of the deposition.16 At other times, a degree of
selectivity was introduced in the appointments. In 1391, about half the
members of the episcopal bench were selected as triers; in 1401, the
proportion was roughly a third; in 1426, about a half again.17 This
suggests that discrimination was exercised to ensure that only those
individuals who were most willing and most able to perform the duties
assigned to them were appointed as triers. Usually these were bishops
with a proven track record of administrative competence and service to
the crown.18 In 1391, for example, the five bishops appointed to try
petitions from England, Ireland, Wales and Scotland included William
Courtenay, archbishop of Canterbury (briefly chancellor in 1381);
Robert Braybrooke, bishop of London (chancellor, 1382–3); William
Wykeham, bishop of Winchester (chancellor, 1367–71, 1389–91);
Thomas Arundel, bishop of Ely (chancellor, 1386–9 and currently
serving in this position); and Walter Skirlawe, bishop of Durham (keeper
of the privy seal, 1382–3).
We cannot be sure how much judicial work bishops undertook in
parliament, for the petitions did not routinely record which cases par-
ticular triers scrutinized. However, the chronicler Thomas Walsingham
shed valuable light on the process when he noted that a petition pre-
13 See G. Dodd, Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in the Late
Middle Ages (Oxford, 2007), pp. 91–109.
14 C. Given-Wilson et al. (eds), Parliament Rolls of Medieval England (Leicester, 2005) [hereafter
PROME], parliament of 1341, item 3; parliament of 1354, items 6–7.
15 PROME, parliament of October 1377, items 9–10. For attendance of the episcopate at this
parliament see R. G. Davies, ‘The attendance of the episcopate in English parliaments, 1376–1461’,
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 129 (1979–81), pp. 30–81, at pp. 55–6.
16 PROME, parliament of 1399, items 8–9; Davies, ‘Attendance of episcopate’, p. 59.
17 PROME, parliament of 1391, items 5–6; parliament of 1401, items 6–7; parliament of 1426,
items 6–7, for the triers. See Davies, ‘Attendance of episcopate’, pp. 58 and 59 (1391 and 1401); and
N. H. Nicholas (ed.), Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council (7 vols; London, 1834), II,
pp. 188 (1426) for attendance.
18 See discussion in Dodd, Justice and Grace, pp. 101–3.
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sented by Michael de la Pole in 1399 was dispatched by a sub-committee
of triers comprising the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop of Win-
chester, the abbot of St Albans and the earl of Northumberland, besides
two royal justices.19 This suggests a disproportionately high input by
members of the senior clergy into parliamentary judicial processes. A
fragment of evidence dating to the start of Edward III’s reign points to
a similar conclusion. In response to a petition presented in c.1331 by
William de Hoo, who alleged that his goods and chattels had been
illegally seized by exchequer officials when he had been expelled from
the manor of Tolworth (Surrey), the endorsement stated that it had
been ‘agreed that those who have complaints against the king’s minis-
ters are to deliver their petitions on this to [Robert Wyvil] bishop of
Salisbury’.20 This suggests that the bishop had been given particular
responsibility for those cases of special sensitivity relating to alleged
malpractice within government.
To some extent these impressions are confirmed when we shift our
focus from parliament to the council, where the records are rather more
revealing. Like parliament, a great proportion of the routine business of
the king’s council – that is to say his permanent ‘executive’ council,
usually based at Westminster, overseeing the day-to-day running of
government – was taken up receiving and dispatching petitions.21 Cler-
gymen, and especially bishops, shouldered much of this burden, for
attendance lists show that they were most assiduous attendees of council
meetings and regularly formed the most consistent element: while senior
lay lords might not always have been present, there were always bishops
acting in this capacity.22 The endorsement of a petition presented in
1328, from the workers and weavers of cloth in Norfolk, illustrates this
point clearly, for it was noted that the supplication had been brought
for adjudication into ‘the presence of the bishops of Durham, Ely,
Worcester and others of the council’, implying that the three bishops
comprised the essential core of the council’s membership.23 With the
virtual automatic attendance of the chancellor, treasurer and keeper of
the privy seal, who were usually also clergymen, the king’s council could
take on a distinctly ecclesiastical hue.24 Take, for example, the names of
those councillors who considered a petition presented by the merchants
19 J. Taylor, W. R. Childs and L. Watkiss (eds), Thomas, Walsingham, The St Albans Chronicle,
Volume II, 1394–1422 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 262–4.
20 SC 8/52/2597.
21 J. F. Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1913), pp.
262–306; G. Dodd, ‘Henry IV’s Council, 1399–1405’, in G. Dodd and D. Biggs (eds), Henry IV:
The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406 (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 95–115.
22 J. L. Kirby, ‘Councils and councillors of Henry IV, 1399–1413’, Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 5th ser., 14 (1964), pp. 35–65, esp. appendix.
23 SC 8/266/13292; printed in Rotuli Parliamentorum (6 vols; London, 1767–7), II, p. 28 (no. 50).
24 Interestingly, contemporaries sometimes appear to have thought of the council as an essentially
clerical body, by addressing their letters to it using diplomatic usually reserved for prelates (i.e.
‘Tresreverentz piers en Dieux’). See Nicholas (ed.), Proceedings and Ordinances, II, pp. 56, 57–8, 71,
196–7.
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of Bordeaux on 4 June 1405, in which the latter requested confirmation
of their rights to trade in England.25 The list indicated the attendance of
the chancellor (Edmund Stafford, bishop of Exeter); the treasurer
(Henry Bowet, bishop of Bath and Wells); the keeper of the privy seal
(Thomas Langley, dean of York); together with Thomas Arundel, arch-
bishop of Canterbury; Henry Beaufort, bishop of Lincoln; John
Trefnant, bishop of Hereford; Richard Young, bishop of Bangor; John
Bottlesham, bishop of Rochester; and four low status laymen.26 Simi-
larly, a list of names for a council meeting dating to 12 February 1407
indicates that besides the key officers of state and of the household, the
only other men in attendance were: Nicholas Bubwith, bishop of
London; Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester; and Thomas Langley,
bishop of Durham.27 Another petition presented between 1426 and 1431
was endorsed with the names of Henry Chichele, archbishop of Canter-
bury; John Kemp, archbishop of York (and chancellor); Philip Morgan,
bishop of Ely; John Stafford, bishop of Bath and Wells, together with
Lords Cromwell and Bourgchier.28 In the parliament of 1426, it was
agreed that any petitions not dealt with in the assembly should ‘be
committed to the king’s council by the aforesaid authority, to hear all
the matters specified in the same petitions, and determine them accord-
ing to their discretions and good faith and conscience’.29 Well over a
dozen petitions survive which were dealt with in this way. On each is
noted the name of a councillor, presumably to indicate his special
responsibility for that case. While four petitions recorded the involve-
ment of two lay lords (i.e. the earl of Stafford and the duke of Glouc-
ester (two each) ),30 the majority were assigned to bishops: John
Stafford, bishop of Bath; Phillip Morgan, bishop of Worcester; John
Fordham, bishop of Ely; Thomas Langley, bishop of Durham; and
William Alnwick, bishop of Norwich.31
In their capacity as councillors and parliamentary triers, many
bishops were regularly exposed to the full gamut of disputes, injustices
and difficulties that adversely affected the lives of large numbers of the
king’s subjects. As will already be obvious, there was no question that
they were assigned to these roles only to adjudicate on petitions relating
25 See PROME, parliament of January 1397, item 40.
26 SC 8/229/11432. See also SC 8/335/15836 which notes the names of Thomas Arundel, arch-
bishop of Canterbury, William Wykeham, bishop of Winchester, Thomas Langley, bishop of
Durham (chancellor), and Nicholas Bubwith, bishop of London, in addition to Thomas Neville,
Lord Furnivall (treasurer), John Prophet (keeper of the privy seal) and Edward, duke of York. The
petition is dated 18 November 1406, when parliament was in session. The names do not correspond
to the membership of the committees of triers appointed in parliament at that time, and in fact the
group is described in the endorsement as constituting the council.
27 SC 8/147/7312.
28 SC 8/47/2331.
29 PROME, parliament of 1426, item 21.
30 SC 8/96/4767; 121/6016; 138/6879; 150/7493.
31 SC 8/96/4761; 101/5027; 101/5041; 111/5523; 113/5613; 115/5732; 115/5734; 118/5866; 121/6012;
135/6709; 143/7137; 148/7383; 158/7900.
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to church matters: from piracy on the high seas, to banditry in the
localities, to the administrative incompetence or corruption of the king’s
ministers, members of the episcopate were called upon to resolve a great
number of requests and complaints from laymen that were not readily
resolvable through common law processes (in addition to a good
number of supplications presented by clergy). Viewing the lists of
bishops who were appointed on these tribunals, however, provides only
a partial insight into such activities, for bishops were also not infre-
quently nominated to ad hoc commissions sent into the localities to
investigate and settle problems that had come to the attention of the
crown. Often, these commissions were generated from petitions which
the parliamentary triers and/or king’s councillors had themselves scru-
tinized. In response to the petition presented by the cloth workers of
Norfolk in 1328 noted earlier, for example, William Airmyn, bishop of
Norwich was assigned by the bishop-councillors of the king to investi-
gate (with others) the truth of the cloth-makers’ allegation that Robert
de Poley was using his office as alnager to extort fines and to force them
to manufacture cloth at unaccustomed lengths.32 In 1391, the bishops
of London and Ely, together with Richard Lescrope, were charged
by parliament to arbitrate in a dispute between Walter Sibile, on the one
hand, and William Coggeshale and Nicholas Twyford, on the other.33
These men were prominent London merchants, but the dispute origi-
nated in the provinces, between Sibile’s tenants in Landwade (Cambs.)
and Coggeshale and Twyford’s tenants in Exning (Suffolk). In May
1413, shortly after Henry V had succeeded to the throne, the bishops of
Exeter and Bath and Wells were charged to expedite unresolved cases
brought before Henry IV by various men of Bayonne.34 In 1426, the
burgesses and tenants of Melcombe Regis requested special dispensation
because of their poverty: John Stafford, bishop of Bath, together with
William Cheyne (justice of the king’s bench) and John Juyn (justice of
the common pleas and chief baron of the exchequer) were charged to
conduct a survey to decide whether financial respite should be allowed
to the town.35 Finally, in 1427, John Stafford, bishop of Bath and Wells
and William Alnwick, bishop of Norwich were assigned by parliament
to investigate the circumstances of John Botiller’s imprisonment at the
hands of William Orwell and others from Calais following disturbances
there at the end of Henry V’s reign.36
In other contexts the involvement of bishops in arbitration and adju-
dication can be discerned from the terms of the commissions themselves.
Thus, Henry Gower, bishop of St David’s, was appointed with four
32 SC 8/266/13292. See also SC 8/17/811 and SC 8/268/13364. For the response of Poley, see SC
8/268/13369. For the commission, see CPR, 1327–30, pp. 297–8.
33 SC 8/21/1044; 21/1045.
34 CPR, 1413–1416, p. 33.
35 SC 8/128/6388.
36 SC 8/96/4767.
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laymen in May 1332 to act in the place of Gilbert Talbot, justice of
South Wales, to respond to petitions presented in several parliaments
complaining about the oppressions of Roger Mortimer when he had
been justice of Wales.37 In August 1335, John Stratford, archbishop of
Canterbury and Henry Burghersh, bishop of Lincoln were charged to
investigate the complaints of merchants who claimed to have suffered
diverse oppressions in York by the office-holders of that city.38 And in
1337, Richard de Bury, bishop of Durham and John Kirkby, bishop of
Carlisle, were part of a large commission to investigate and fix the
border between Yorkshire and Westmorland, following a report pre-
sented in parliament that disputes had arisen over the matter between
the people of both counties.39 In other cases, commissions involving
bishops appear to have arisen from policy decisions taken by the crown
on its own initiative. This was especially the case when inquiries were
needed to investigate the actions of the king’s ministers and officers. In
1314, for example, Walter Langton, bishop of Coventry and Lichfield,
together with Hervey Staunton (justice of common pleas), were
appointed to inquire into the ‘many evils and losses’ which had occurred
in Cambridgeshire as a result of the failure of the king’s commissioners
to carry out their survey of walls and ditches properly.40 A few years
later, in 1321, Walter Stapledon, bishop of Exeter, with Robert de
Stokheye, received a commission to inquire into the behaviour of the
bailiffs of hundreds across Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall and Devon.41 On
28 April 1340 three commissions were issued with the purpose of insti-
gating a complete overhaul of customs officers across the kingdom, for
what was termed the ‘negligence’ of those who had held office during
the king’s absence abroad. The archbishop of Canterbury headed the
commission dealing with ports in the west; Richard de Bury, bishop of
Durham headed the commission appointed to survey northern ports;
while Henry Burghersh, bishop of Lincoln led the commission assigned
to eastern ports.42
Why were senior clerics involved in these activities? It is a question
that has rarely received direct consideration, perhaps because the
answers have appeared too obvious to be worth detailed investigation.
In practical terms, the reasons why bishops were called on to settle
disputes and arbitrate between warring parties admittedly appear to be
straightforward. In many of the examples given above, and especially
the commissions sent into the localities, it will be readily seen that
bishops were frequently appointed to act in cases that concerned indi-
viduals or communities located in their dioceses, so their involvement
37 CPR, 1330–1334, p. 346.
38 CPR, 1334–1338, p. 205.
39 Ibid., p. 445.
40 CPR, 1313–1317, p. 147.
41 CPR, 1321–1324, p. 15.
42 CPR, 1338–1340, pp. 507–9.
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presumably reflected a belief that they possessed the standing and
authority to be able to restore peace and harmony. There is an argu-
ment to be made that the crown utilized bishops in this fashion not
because they were senior clergymen, but because they were powerful
landowners who possessed the same influence as important secular lords
and because they had equal responsibility to ensure that peace existed in
the territories which fell within their authority.43 On the other hand,
there is a symmetry about many of these commissions, which suggests
that the choice of personnel reflected a conscious desire by the crown to
mobilize both the secular and ecclesiastical arms to give clout and
prestige to the proceedings. In this sense, the ecclesiastical standing
of bishops was not incidental but integral to the workings of such
commissions.
In other respects, historians have emphasized the pragmatic nature
of the clerical presence on commissions, in parliament and the council,
and more generally within government. Robert Swanson summarized
the underlying dynamic when he stated that ‘the relationship affecting
clerics in state service was blatantly symbiotic: individuals were as
dependent on the crown for securing their careers within the church as
the crown was dependent on the church for providing through those
careers sufficient finance and motivation for continued service’.44 In
other words, the clergy served the king to enhance their careers and gain
promotion; the crown employed clergy because it was cheaper to remu-
nerate clergymen than laymen, for clerics could be provided with eccle-
siastical livings which made no direct impact on crown finances.
Undoubtedly the mutual benefits to accrue by employing clergy in royal
administration were an immensely powerful incentive, but the danger in
depicting this relational dynamic in such functional and acquisitive
terms is that it suggests that no higher motives existed for engaging
senior ecclesiastics in crown service. It casts the clergy in particular as
either single-minded careerists or unwilling (but resigned) state function-
aries, offering their services because this was the only route to ecclesi-
astical preferment. While this may have been true of many lower-status
clergy, still hungry for advancement, it is not clear how important such
a consideration would have been for bishops, who had already reached
the pinnacle of ecclesiastical preferment and whose only real possibility
43 The most obvious, but also arguably the most atypical, example of bishops exercising secular
jurisdiction by virtue of their temporal powers are the bishops of Durham, who held the bishopric
(or palatinate) of Durham as a secular franchise: see most recently, C. D. Liddy, The Bishopric of
Durham in the Late Middle Ages: Lordship, Community and the Cult of St Cuthbert (Woodbridge,
2008). See also a useful discussion of the military activities of late medieval bishops by P. H.
Cullum, ‘Virginitas and virilitas: Richard Scrope and his fellow bishops’, in P. J. P. Goldberg (ed.),
Richard Scrope: Archbishop, Rebel, Martyr (Donington, 2007), pp. 86–99, esp. pp. 86–91.
44 R. N. Swanson, Church and Society in Late Medieval England (Oxford, 1989), p. 104. Scholar-
ship has tended to concentrate on how individuals became bishops through their service to the
crown, rather than what they did for the crown once they had attained this position; for example:
L. Betcherman, ‘The making of bishops in the Lancastrian period’, Speculum, 41 (1966),
pp. 397–419.
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for advancement lay in translation to a richer and more prestigious see.
The point is that bishops did not have to serve the crown. Many, of
course, did not. For those who did, it is virtually impossible to tell
whether they did so because they were driven by the promise of reward;
because they felt an obligation to the king, perhaps in part because of
the favour he had shown to them; because they were already ‘civil-
service’ minded, having served in government before promotion to the
episcopal bench; or because they felt that it was part of their spiritual
vocation which, more by default than by design, brought them material
reward and advancement.
One way of shifting the emphasis towards a more ‘vocational’ per-
spective is to analyse the ideas and principles which underpinned the
operation of discretionary jurisdiction, for this reveals a set of assump-
tions and propositions with which most clergymen, and certainly most
university educated bishops, will have strongly identified. With so much
focus by scholars on chancery and the development of the concepts of
conscience and equity, it is easy to assume that it was only in chancery
and only in the fifteenth century that theological principles were of
relevance in a secular legal context. But in fact ‘conscience’ was part of
a much broader set of ideas and values that underpinned natural law,
and natural law was from the very outset axiomatic in providing a
theoretical and philosophical basis for the operation of discretionary
jurisdiction.45 One of the reasons these connections have not previously
been made is because legal historians have focused too rigidly on the
concept of conscience as the guiding principle behind the operation of
discretionary justice. In fact, ‘reason’ was the word most commonly
used by contemporaries, and especially petitioners, to conceptualize the
fundamental authority which they believed the examiners of petitions
drew on to reach a fair and just verdict. Like conscience, the concept of
reason went to the very heart of natural law.46 Thus, it was common-
place in petitions presented throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries for supplicants to express the hope that their request
would receive a favourable hearing or a suitable remedy ‘according to
right and reason’ or ‘reason and the rule of law’ (it was also common for
petitioners to appeal to God and to a sense of charity). Petitioners
understood that their quest for justice in parliament, the council or
chancery pushed them outside the established, codified strictures of the
common law into a position where achieving resolution depended
almost entirely upon the sound judgment and good sense of those who
45 The key work is Doe, Fundamental Authority, passim. I have also benefited by consulting R. L.
Jefferson, ‘The uses of natural law in the royal courts of fifteenth century England’ (unpublished
DPhil Thesis, University of Utah, 1972).
46 For discussion of the concept of reason, see Doe, Fundamental Authority, ch. 5; M. J. Wilks, The
Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 211–15. There is also
useful discussion in J. A. Alford, ‘The idea of reason in Piers Plowman’, in E. D. Kennedy, R.
Waldron and J. S. Wittig (eds), Medieval English Studies Presented to George Kane (Woodbridge,
1988), pp. 199–215.
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received and considered such requests. This placed a high premium on
the personal qualities, knowledge and wisdom of both the king and
those to whom he delegated such matters, for providing justice in these
cases was a matter of discretion rather than prescription.
All this is important because natural law and its associated concepts
of conscience and reason, and indeed of equity, were firmly rooted in a
theological and canonical scholarly tradition. Norman Doe offers a
succinct summary: ‘The natural law outlook advances the view that law
is not dependent for its authority solely upon human enactment or
usage. Within the natural law view human law is also treated as origi-
nating in, and as deriving authority from, the abstract notion of a
divinely given morality.’47 Doe illustrated this relationship by drawing
on the work of two of the foremost legal theorists of the fifteenth
century, the royal justice John Fortescue and Reginald Pecock, bishop
of Chichester. Both men, it is to be noted, served in parliament on the
committees charged with trying petitions.48 Fortescue remarked that
‘natural law is nothing else but the participation of the eternal [i.e.
divine] law in a rational creature’, whilst Pecock declared that it is ‘the
judgment of [man’s natural] reason which is the moral law of nature and
the moral law of God’.49 Both writers, and especially Fortescue, were
strongly influenced by the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas
Aquinas, whose view that law was of divine origin and must accord with
reason featured prominently in his work.50 The ideas of ‘reason’ (or
reasonableness) and ‘equity’ were as intrinsic to the workings of the
courts of the church as they were to the king’s discretionary courts.51
47 Doe, Fundamental Authority, p. 60. See also F. Pollock, Jurisprudence and Legal Essays
(London, 1961), pp. 130–2; Wilks, Problem of Sovereignty, pp. 210–11; T. F. T. Plucknett and J. L.
Barton (eds), St German’s Doctor and Student, Selden Society, 91 (1974), pp. xxiii−xxix; and Alford,
‘Idea of reason’, pp. 200–7.
48 For Fortescue, see PROME, parliament of 1445, item 6; parliament of 1447, item 7; parliament
of February 1449, item 4; parliament of November 1449, item 4; parliament of 1450, item 4;
parliament of 1453, item 4; and parliament of 1455, item 5. For Pecock, see PROME, parliament
of 1455, item 6. For summaries of the careers of both men, see E. W. Ives, ‘Fortescue, Sir John (c.
1397–1479)’, and W. Scase, ‘Pecock, Reginald (b.c. 1392, d. in or after 1459)’, Oxford of National
Biography (2004), online edn.
49 Cf. Doe, Fundamental Authority, pp. 61–2. See also N. Doe, ‘Fifteenth-century concepts of law:
Fortescue and Pecock’, History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), pp. 257–80, esp. pp. 269–73. On
Fortescue, see also S. B. Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge,
1936), pp. 199–203; A. Cromartie, ‘Common law, counsel and consent in Fortescue’s political
theory’, in L. Clark and C. Carpenter (eds), The Fifteenth Century IV: Political Culture in Late
Medieval Britain (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 45–67, esp. pp. 55–6.
50 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. and trans. T. Gilby et al. (60 vols; London, 1964–73),
28, 1a2æ, question 91, articles 1–3; D. J. O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London, 1967), ch.
7; A. J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytical Reconstruction (Oxford, 1996), pp.
89–96, 126–31. For an introduction, see D. E. Luscombe, ‘Natural morality and natural law’, in N.
Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy
(Cambridge, 1982, repr. 1984), pp. 705–19.
51 H. Coing, ‘English equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the canon law’, Law Quarterly
Review, 71 (1955), pp. 223–41; J. L. Barton, ‘Roman law in England’, Ius Romanum Medii Aevi,
pars v, 13a (1971), pp. 64–5, 69–71; J. L. Barton, ‘Equity in the medieval common law’, in R. A.
Newman (ed.), Equity in the World’s Legal System (Brussels, 1973), pp. 139–55; Plucknett and
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They were the guiding principles which underpinned canon law, as well
as civil law, and bishops will have drawn on them extensively in the
running of their diocesan affairs.52
We should not, then, conceive of a situation in which bishops and
other senior clergymen were invited by the crown to act as judges in
cases of discretionary justice simply because they were willing and
capable servants of the royal bureaucracy. Nor should we characterize
this discretionary jurisdiction merely as an offshoot of the secular legal
arm. Instead, we should regard their involvement as a vital prerequisite
for the successful implementation of a form of jurisdiction which gained
currency and legitimacy precisely because it was not obviously secular in
nature, but operated more clearly in accordance with the fundamental
precepts of morality and the divine will. Thus, whereas statutory legis-
lation was created in parliament by the king and political community by
popular consent, and whereas the common law was the product of the
judicial will and was shaped by legal custom and precedence, discretion-
ary justice was considered to be an abstract ‘system of precepts and
prohibitions created by God’.53 As the senior figures in the church,
bishops were amongst the best-qualified individuals in the kingdom –
besides the king himself – to identify and follow this divinely ordained
moral code. In part, this was because, as a result of their spiritual
vocation and duties, they had a natural and obvious claim to be able to
pronounce judgment on the basis of divine authority, but in part too it
was because the principles of natural law and reason were understood to
reside in and to be revealed by scripture. Those best qualified to read
and interpret scripture were therefore in a particularly strong position to
be able to understand the proper application of natural law and reason.
Both Fortescue and Pecock noted the important role which scripture
played in revealing the divine truth,54 though Pecock famously placed
more emphasis on the importance and value of a learned clergy who
possessed sufficient rational acuity to be able to discern natural law
where scripture was lacking.55
All this leads to the conclusion that bishops will have regarded their
involvement in royal administration, and especially their role in the
implementation of discretionary justice, not simply (and perhaps not
Barton (eds), St German’s Doctor and Student, pp. xxix−xxxix. G. R. Evans, Law and Theology in
the Middle Ages (London, 2002), pp. 81–119.
52 W. S. Holdsworth, ‘The early history of equity’, Michigan Law Review, 13 (1914–15), pp.
293–301; C. Lefebvre, ‘Natural equity and canonical equity’, Natural Law Forum, 8 (1963), pp.
122–36; J. A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (Harlow, 1995), pp. 154–8.
53 Doe, Fundamental Authority, p. 60.
54 Ibid., pp. 64–5.
55 R. Pecock, The Repressor of Over Much Blaming of the Clergy, ed. C. Babington (2 vols;
London, 1860), I, pp. 16–17, 39–40, 121–6; II, pp. 11–12; see also J. H. Landman, ‘ “The Doom of
Resoun” accommodating lay interpretation in late medieval England’, in B. A. Hanawalt and D.
Wallace (eds), Medieval Crime and Social Control (Minneapolis, 1999), pp. 90–123, esp. pp. 108–10;
S. E. Lahey, ‘Reginald Pecock on the authority of reason, scripture and tradition’, Journal of
Ecclesiastical History, 56 (2005), pp. 235–60, esp. pp. 248, 256, 258–9.
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even predominantly) as part of a career-advancement strategy, nor an
obligation they must discharge as tenants-in-chief, but rather as part of their
spiritual vocation. Arguably, when senior clergy sat on conciliar tribunals
or parliamentary committees, they will have understood themselves to have
been discharging a vital pastoral role as guardians of a legal/moral code
created by God Himself.56 Thus, service to the English state by the higher
clergy was indeed conceived as a symbiotic relationship, as Robert Swanson
suggests, but this worked on much more than a pragmatic calculation of
mutual interest borne out of material gain. From the perspective of the
clergy, the high-profile role taken by bishops in discharging prerogative
justice on behalf of the king will have reinforced the relevance and authority
of the clergy in society. It may also, to an extent, have helped the English
church expiate itself for apparently conceding to the crown – in relation to
civil cases – the fundamental canonical principle that no clergyman should
be subject to the jurisdiction of a secular court: if some of these courts, and
especially those that dealt with civil cases, were dominated by clergymen
anyway, the subjection of the church to secular jurisdiction could be
conveniently hidden.57 From the perspective of the crown, the placement
of bishops on these tribunals underlined the alignment of the church,
and ultimately of the Divinity, with royal government, and significantly
increased the legitimacy and authority of the decisions taken on cases that
often required careful negotiation between individuals or communities in
conflict.
These points suggest new ways of looking at the emergence of the
chancellor as the focal point of equitable jurisdiction in the fifteenth
century, for this was the ultimate expression of the mutuality of interests
that existed between the church and state in the provision of discretion-
ary justice. Whereas in the council or in parliament bishops usually
shared their duties with lay lords, judicial experts and other suitably
qualified personnel, in chancery the responsibility for bringing remedies
to cases presented by litigants rested solely on the shoulders of the
chancellor. In the fourteenth century, the chancellor’s office was domi-
nated by senior clergymen, mainly bishops, and by the fifteenth century
they exercised a virtual monopoly. The development of what would
later be known as ‘equity’ in chancery has therefore quite understand-
ably been regarded as a phenomenon closely tied to, and explained by,
the ecclesiastical background of the men who occupied the office. As a
result of the control of the chancellorship by prelates, canonical and
civil law precepts were applied to its proceedings in much the same
way as they informed the workings of ecclesiastical courts.58 It may be
56 This perspective is considered in more general terms by Thompson, ‘Prelates and politics’, pp.
75–81.
57 R. H. Helmholz, Ius Commune in England: Four Studies (Oxford, 2001), ch. 4. In practice, in
England (unlike the Continent) benefit of clergy extended only to cases subject to criminal law.
58 P. Vinogradoff, ‘Reason and conscience in sixteenth-century jurisprudence’, Law Quarterly
Review, 24 (1908), pp. 373–84; W. T. Barbour, ‘Some aspects of fifteenth-century chancery’,
Harvard Law Review, 31 (1918), pp. 834–59; M. Beilby, ‘The profits of expertise: the rise of the civil
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further pointed out that the period when clerical chancellors began to
monopolize the office at the end of the fourteenth century coincided
with the period when chancery itself emerged as a court in its own right,
handling supplications directly from the king’s subjects. Arguably, this
was no coincidence. As chancery developed a much clearer independent
jurisdictional role, the power of the chancellor came under increasing
scrutiny, and particularly from the late fourteenth century the parlia-
mentary Commons began to voice concerns about the potential for
despotic and arbitrary judgments to be taken against the king’s sub-
jects.59 Arguably, having senior clergy appointed as chancellors was the
most effective way of addressing these concerns because of a contem-
porary assumption that bishops and archbishops were best suited,
besides the king himself, to make judgments according to the principles
of natural law and reason. The ecclesiastical background of the chan-
cellor was thus becoming vital to the integrity of the court and its
reputation as a place where impartial justice could be obtained.
To some extent this perspective is borne out by an important shift
in linguistic usage. At the end of the fourteenth century, alongside
‘reason’, the term ‘conscience’ began to be used in the records. It is
important to stress that conscience was not a word used exclusively in a
chancery setting,60 but it had particular resonance with chancery once it
began to handle cases requiring discretionary judgments en masse, and
became part of the regular petitionary lexicon of chancery bills after the
middle years of the fifteenth century.61 In 1391, a number of petitions
handed into parliament were forwarded to the chancellor with the
instruction that he should summon the relevant warring parties before
him into chancery where he was to provide a remedy according to ‘what
justice and reason and good faith and good conscience demand is to be
done, by authority of parliament’.62 There is a record of Henry V
ordering his chancellor to show a supplicant ‘all the fauour and ese þat
may de don by lawe and conscience’, and at another time, to do ‘what
lawyers and chancery equity’, in M. Hicks (ed.), Profit, Piety and the Professions in Later Medieval
England (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 72–90, at pp. 73–4; T. S. Haskett, ‘The medieval English Court of
Chancery’, Law and History Review, 14 (1996), pp. 245–313, esp. pp. 256–66. Note, however, the
caution expressed by J. Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, VI: 1483–1558 (Oxford,
2003), pp. 180–1.
59 PROME, parliament of October 1383, item 51; parliament of January 1390, item 33; parliament
of 1394, item 52; parliament of 1437, item 25.
60 For example, see PROME, parliament of 1394, item 10, where Richard II instructed his council
to adjudicate in a dispute between Sir Robert Lisle and John Windsor, stating that they should
‘bring about a good and reasonable settlement thereof between the aforesaid parties, as reason and
good conscience demand’; and SC 8/340/16034 – an endorsement to a petition instructing the
council to give redress to the petitioner according to ‘what good faith and conscience demand in
this case’. For other contexts, see D. R. Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in
Early Modern England (Farnham, 2010), pp. 22–4.
61 Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, p. 82.
62 SC 8/21/1041A; 21/1042; 95/4707; 95/4709; 97/4904.
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may be doon by Lawe conscience and reson’.63 In an oft-quoted passage
from a chancery bill presented early in the fifteenth century, a supplicant
asked that his debtors be summoned before the chancellor ‘to come
before you in the king’s chancery, which is the court of conscience, there
to answer thereto as reason and conscience demand’.64 In 1468 the
chancellor Robert Stillington, bishop of Bath and Wells noted that he
was both a temporal judge and a ‘judge of conscience’.65 A year later
he remarked that ‘in Chancery a man shall not be prejudiced by
mispleader, or for default of form, but by conscience’.66 Other cases
have been found where conscience is mentioned in more negative terms,
for example where a defendant was said to have acted ‘against con-
science’.67 In all these instances, it is worth noting that conscience was
not used in a personal sense (i.e. his or her conscience), but in more
abstract terms, as a shared set of moral and legal standards against
which what was right, fair and just could be measured.
It was a concept which senior clergy were particularly well qualified
to invoke. According to Fortescue, the word conscience came from ‘con
and scioscis. And so together they make “to know with God”; to wit: to
know the will of God as near as one reasonably can’.68 This highlighted
a contemporary belief that making a judgment according to conscience
was not a matter of subjective opinion, but was an objective truth
attained through applied knowledge and learning.69 Bishops in general,
and chancellors in particular, were a highly educated elite and so amply
fulfilled this requirement.70 Fifteenth-century chancellors were notably
learned men: only three of the nineteen individuals appointed as chan-
cellor between 1399 and 1504 had not secured advanced degrees at
Oxford or Cambridge in divinity, civil law or canon law, and of these
three, two were laymen.71 Historians have been quick to suggest that the
educational background of fifteenth-century chancellors was a key
determinant in establishing the core principles upon which equity, as a
63 J. H. Fisher, M. Richardson and J. L. Fisher (eds), An Anthology of Chancery English (Knox-
ville, TN, 1984), nos. 39, 73.
64 W. P. Baildon (ed.), Select Cases in Chancery, A.D. 1364 to 1471, Selden Society, 10 (1896), no.
123 (my emphasis).
65 Cf. A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of
Assumpsit (Oxford, 1975), pp. 397–8.
66 Cf. Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, p. 78.
67 Klinck, Conscience, Equity, p. 14, n. 6.
68 Cf. Doe, Fundamental Authority, p. 133. For more general discussions of conscience see T. Potts,
‘Conscience’, in Kretzmann, Kenny and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, pp. 687–704; and D. C. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to
MacIntyre (University Park, PA, 2001), chs 1–4.
69 St German’s Doctor and Student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, p. xxvi; T. C. Potts, Conscience
in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 2–5; Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, esp.
p. 8.
70 J. T. Thomas, ‘The training of an elite group: English bishops in the fifteenth century’, Trans-
actions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., 60 (1970), pp. 1–54, at pp. 12–19.
71 Jefferson, ‘Uses of natural law’, table 3, p. 108.
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distinct body of law, was to emerge in the early modern period;72 but it
is equally possible to argue from the opposite direction and suggest that
the expanding remit of chancellors in the field of discretionary justice
placed a particular premium on their educational background and their
familiarity with the intellectual traditions surrounding natural law, so it
became expedient for the king and for the proper running of chancery to
have men appointed at its head who were of the highest intellectual
calibre.
The use of the term ‘conscience’ in a chancery context underlined the
interconnectivity of the religious and secular worlds and the role of the
wise and learned chancellor in acting as a bridge between the two,
determining what was the will of God in a secular civil-law context. It
might be said, then, that the emergence of conscience to describe the
moral/legal code underpinning the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction
indicated a desire to imbue this type of jurisdiction more explicitly with
theological learning and spiritual authority. The significance of the shift
in language is described by Norman Doe, who observes that ‘whereas
reason may have been largely something of a technical idea of right . . .
conscience was a distinct moral force known directly, principally
through the pulpit and the confessional, by the ordinary citizen . . .
Everyone knew that to offend one’s conscience would imperil the soul’.73
Taken to an extreme, the appearance of the term ‘conscience’ explicitly
underlined the idea that the chancellor, in meting out justice, was simul-
taneously in the business of saving people’s souls. A. W. B. Simpson
puts it succinctly: ‘as a judge of conscience [the chancellor’s] primary
function and concern was not with the petitioner but with the respon-
dent and of the good of his soul’.74 There were, indeed, aspects of
chancery procedure which suggested a close correlation with the moral
standing of the individuals concerned, for whereas the common law
courts were bound by a strict system of written legal proofs, in chancery
legal truth was often obtained by means of cross-examination and con-
fession under oath before the chancellor.75 Thus, in a bill presented late
in the fourteenth century the chancellor was asked to obtain a remedy
for the supplicants ‘by examination or confession’; and in 1408, a record
72 Barbour, ‘Aspects of fifteenth-century chancery’, p. 859; Simpson, Common Law of Contract,
pp. 400–2; Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, pp. 74–5; Haskett, ‘Medieval English Court of Chancery’,
pp. 257–66, 311–13; P. Tucker, ‘The early history of the Court of Chancery: a comparative study’,
English Historical Review, 115 (2000), pp. 791–811, at pp. 795–6, 802.
73 Doe, Fundamental Authority, p. 132.
74 Simpson, Common Law of Contract, pp. 398–9. There is also useful discussion of the application
of the term/concept ‘conscience’ in chancery by T. S. Haskett, ‘Conscience, justice and authority in
the late-medieval English Court of Chancery’, in A. Musson (ed.), Expectations of the Law in the
Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 151–63, at pp. 158–61.
75 The best summary of the differences between common law and chancery procedure is in J. H.
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (London, 2002), pp. 102–4. See also M.
Macnair, ‘Equity and conscience’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (2007), pp. 659–81, esp. pp.
673–76; and Klinck, Conscience, Equity, pp. 29–30. According to Baker, ‘the clerical chancellors
were exercising the temporal counterpart of the confessional’ (p. 90).
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of proceedings in chancery noted that the defendant had been ‘sworn
upon the Holy Gospels to speak the truth on the matter’.76 Clerical
chancellors were especially well suited to pass judgments on cases
involving broken or disputed pledges over feoffments-to-use, as this was
often a matter of establishing the personal integrity and honesty of the
disputing parties. Such cases constituted a large proportion of chancery
business by the mid-fifteenth century.77
There is an especially illuminating parliamentary petition presented in
Henry V’s reign which underlines the contemporary perception of the
close links that existed between chancery process, on the one hand, and
canon and civil law on the other, though in this context the connection
was made in decidedly negative terms. In their petition, presented
during the parliament of March 1416, the Commons complained about
the use made by chancery and the exchequer of writs of sub poena and
certis de causis for matters which they claimed could just as easily be
determined by the common law.78 They asserted that the writs were
reducing the income of the king from the fines, issues and amercements
made in his other courts, and that royal justices were distracted from
their judicial work by having to spend too much of their time examining
the writs. The key accusation, however, related to chancery (and exche-
quer) process itself, of which, incidentally, the people were said to be
ignorant because nothing was on record about how and why the writs
were issued – a reference to the arbitrary nature of the chancellor’s
authority. The Commons stated that cases brought into chancery and
exchequer ‘are unable to be concluded except by means of examination
and the sworn testimony of the parties, according to the terms of the
civil law and the law of holy church, which is to the subversion of your
common law’. By way of underlining the clerical source of these new
procedures, the Commons specified that the ‘deceitful innovation’ had
been introduced by the late John Waltham, bishop of Salisbury.79 The
implication was clear: chancery was undermining the common law as a
result of the imposition of civil and canon law processes and doctrines
by a senior cleric. It was not an especially rounded assessment of the
origins or nature of the chancellor’s jurisdiction, for it ignored the wider
contexts and applications of discretionary justice and natural law –
something modern historians have also tended to do. But it did
76 Select Cases in Chancery, nos 42 and 95, cf. Klinck, Conscience, Equity, p. 30.
77 O. W. Holmes, ‘Early English equity’, Law Quarterly Review, 1 (1885), pp. 162–74; W. T.
Barbour, ‘The history of contract in early English equity’, in P. Vinogradoff (ed.), Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History (Oxford, 1914), pp. 66–168; M. Avery, ‘The history of the equitable
jurisdiction of chancery before 1460’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 42 (1969), pp.
129–44; Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, pp. 78–9.
78 PROME, parliament of March 1416, item 84. For discussion, see St German’s Doctor and
Student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, pp. xl−xlii; and Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, pp. 72–3.
79 In fact, Waltham became bishop of Salisbury in 1388, after working in chancery as Master of
the Rolls between 1381 and 1386, the period during which he is most likely to have overseen these
changes. He died in 1395.
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underline the perception that chancery, run by clergymen, was heavily
imbued with a canon law ethos.
It was not in chancery but in parliament, however, that clerical chan-
cellors most clearly articulated the immutable connection between
God’s will and the rule of law. In so doing, they implicitly claimed for
themselves a position of supreme authority on legal matters within the
kingdom and a special role in guiding and leading the king’s subjects on
what they understood to be the fundamental basis of the law in the
fifteenth-century English state. A common thread in these parliamen-
tary sermons was the exhortation to observe and abide by the principles
of justice and right not because together these formed an immutable
legal code emanating from the king and parliament, but because they
derived from God. Thus, in 1414, Bishop Beaufort urged MPs to follow
the king’s example by adhering to ‘the most commendable disposition
and governance of the holy law of God’.80 Similarly, in December 1421,
Thomas Langley, bishop of Durham, delivered a sermon to parliament
drawing on Psalm xix.7 (‘God’s Law is perfect, and converts the soul’).81
He posited the existence of three types of law: first, the law of power,
which makes men abstain from wrongdoing because of the penalty
prescribed; second, the law of cupidity, or mercenary law, which played
on man’s acquisitive nature; and third, the law of charity ‘which makes
a man generous and liberal, in accordance with the law of God, “which
is the greatest of these, and the root of all good” ’.82 What, exactly,
Beaufort and Langley meant by the ‘law of God’ was perhaps deliber-
ately left unclear, for it was a catch-all phrase that suggested a superior
moral code that ought to underpin all worldly affairs. In the minds of
the theologians, as we have seen, the law of God was synonymous with
natural law.83
The superiority of God’s law in relation to all other legal codes
was heavily pushed by fifteenth-century chancellors. Thus, in 1439, John
Stafford, bishop of Bath and Wells opened parliament with a speech
which alluded to the central importance of divine law in the proper
functioning of society and government. He declared that the king had
summoned parliament in order that the estates should be ‘fixed and
indissolubly united with regard to matters of state, and be opened to the
observance of God’s laws and rules, putting aside or removing all harsh-
ness, so that good and perpetual peace . . . may be sought and eventu-
ally obtained’.84 In 1467 Robert Stillington, bishop of Bath and Wells
similarly declared that ‘justice was the foundation and root of all pros-
perity, peace and politic rule of every realm, upon which all the laws of
80 PROME, parliament of April 1414, item 1. For the following two paragraphs I have greatly
benefited from the research of Jefferson, ‘Uses of natural law’, pp. 74–80. See also discussion by
Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, pp. 196–8.
81 PROME, parliament of December 1421, item 1.
82 Ibid. The biblical reference is 1 Corinthians xiii.13.
83 See above pp. 224–5.
84 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 3.
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the world have been established and based, which depends on three
things: that is to say, the law of God, the law of nature and positive
law’.85 In this context the law of God and the law of nature were
presented as distinct legal codes, though the differences between them
are likely to have been blurred in the minds of the MPs who heard
Stillington speak. Finally, in the parliament of 1489 John Morton pro-
vided one of the most lucid accounts of the fundamental precepts of
medieval law. For him three types of justice existed: ‘commutative,
distributive and that which is a special virtue, establishing equality
in commutations and distributions’.86 In other words, discretionary
justice, founded on the natural law principle of even-handed fairness, or
‘equality’, transcended all other legal classifications. Morton further
expounded on the origins of justice, stating that it derived in the first
instance ‘from God, which is justly called eternal law, from which the
natural law imprinted on other creatures is said to be inextinguishable’.
As the fifteenth century progressed, the articulation of these ideas
appears to have become more elaborate and definitive. Clerical chan-
cellors were fulfilling a special role in bringing to a wide lay audience
concepts that had long informed theological thinking and writing.
Alongside the evocation of God’s law in a political context, parlia-
mentary sermons noticeably began to employ the term ‘equity’. Its
greater prominence in fifteenth-century public discourse did not point to
the existence of a distinct and self-sufficient body of jurisprudence: this
is what ‘equity’ came to mean in the context of the sixteenth-century
chancery.87 Instead, it referred to a principle closely linked to, and in
many ways synonymous with, reason and conscience, and like them it
was deeply embedded in the natural law tradition. Equity pointed to the
doctrine of reasonableness, where transgressions were treated according
to what was fundamentally fair, right and just, especially where the
common law proved deficient or otherwise inadequate.88 Like reason
and conscience, equity had a firm grounding in canon law and so it was
entirely fitting that highly educated senior clergymen should have
spoken authoritatively on the subject and asserted its relevance in a
secular legal context.89 Thus, in 1431, William Lynwood, a distinguished
doctor of civil and canon laws, delivered the opening sermon to parlia-
ment on behalf of the chancellor John Kemp, archbishop of York, who
was absent due to ill-health. In his speech, Lynwood declared that the
rule of the realm of England sprang from three virtues: namely, union
85 PROME, parliament of 1467, item 24.
86 PROME, parliament of 1489, item 0. Thomas Aquinas outlines the differences between com-
mutative and distributive justice in his Summa Theologiae, 37, 2a2æ, Question 61, articles 1–4.
87 This point is most clearly elucidated by Beilby, ‘Profits of expertise’, pp. 77–83.
88 St German’s Doctor and Student, ed. Plucknett and Barton, pp. xlvii−li; Wilks, Problem of
Sovereignty, p. 217; Doe, Fundamental Authority, pp. 101–6; Jefferson, ‘Uses of natural law’, pp.
56–60.
89 See above nn. 51 and 52.
232 REASON, CONSCIENCE AND EQUITY
© 2014 The Author. History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
and unity; peace and tranquillity; and justice and equity.90 He stated
that of late, these virtues had been eroded by intolerable evils, in par-
ticular, justice and equity had been undermined by ‘the maintainers of
suits and the oppressors of the poor’. Parliament had therefore been
summoned to provide suitable remedies.
Two years later, in 1433, the chancellor John Stafford, bishop of Bath
and Wells drew on Psalms (72:3) to explain the obligations of the three
estates to their king: the prelates and lords ought to bring ‘peace, unity
and true concord without fraud or dissimulation’; the knights and those
of the middle estate should ensure that ‘equity and true justice existed
without maintenance and oppression of the poor’; and the common
people and those of lower status were required to show ‘willing obedi-
ence to the king and his laws, without dissembling or grudging’.91 It
is interesting to observe how Stafford, like Lynwood, equated equity
with the fair and just treatment of the poor. The implication of both
sermons, moreover, was that equity was not a quality exhibited only by
chancellors in the context of chancery but was universal, and especially
associated with, or expected to be found in the actions of, the gentry –
the law-keepers of the land. Equity coexisted with justice. It did not
replace it. But by the same token its frequent linkage with justice, as
connected but distinct categories, implied that justice was not sufficient
on its own to ensure that equity was shown in all cases. There was,
moreover, an implication that justice might result in an inequitable
verdict. The chancellor’s prominent role in lecturing – or sermonizing –
to the political community on the importance of equity and other basic
legal principles obviously resonated with his role as the ultimate arbiter
in cases brought before chancery, but his declaration to the parliament
of 1453 that a council was to be formed to which ‘all people might have
recourse for the administration of justice, equity and wisdom’ is another
reminder that neither the chancellor nor chancery exercised a monopoly
on the workings of equitable jurisdiction.92
There is one final area of ecclesiastical involvement in secular juris-
diction which pushes the discussion in an altogether new direction, but
which, more than any other of the examples cited so far, demonstrates
an underlying assumption that senior clergy should be fully integrated
into a secular legal context. So far, the role which bishops fulfilled as the
king’s judges has been described purely in the context of discretionary
justice. The rationale seems fairly clear: discretionary justice required
sound judgment and moral probity. These qualities were underpinned
by the concepts of reason, conscience and equity, which bishops were
considered to possess, and which they claimed to possess, by virtue of
their training and vocation. But this rather distorts the picture, for it has
90 PROME, parliament of 1431, item 2. For his life and career, see R. H. Helmholz, ‘Lyndwood,
William (c. 1375–1446)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online edn.
91 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 3.
92 PROME, parliament of 1453, item 30.
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long been recognized that reason, conscience and equity were as rel-
evant to the workings of the common law as they were in other legal
contexts.93 More to the point, from July 1424, prelates were regularly
appointed as peace commissioners, which placed their legal activities
firmly in a common law context.94 What prompted these appointments
is not immediately clear. There was a precedent, of sorts, at the end of
Henry V’s reign when, on 28 February 1422, the bishops of Winchester,
Salisbury, Bath and Wells, and Exeter, as well as the archbishop of
Canterbury, were assigned a supervisory role on the peace commissions
issued to southern counties.95 By this point Henry V had been away
from England campaigning in France for over six months, and it seems
likely that the bishops were involved in order to address growing con-
cerns about lawlessness in the absence of large numbers of gentry who
filled the ranks of his army and who normally shouldered the burden of
local peacekeeping. In December 1421, as we have seen, the chancellor
Thomas Langley, bishop of Durham, opened proceedings with a speech
about the obligation of everyone to follow his conscience and obey
God’s law, and he went on to state that the aim of the assembly was to
ensure ‘the proper preservation of the peace and the laws of the land’ –
clearly law and (dis)order were high up on the agenda.96 The focus on
southern counties may have reflected particular anxiety about the law-
lessness of soldiers returning from the continent.
In 1424, prelates were incorporated in the peace commissions on a
permanent basis. Twenty-seven counties were affected on this first occa-
sion. Almost all dioceses were involved, with the exception of Lincoln
and York. They were in the king’s hands following the death of Arch-
bishop Henry Bowet in 1423 and the subsequent dispute over the elec-
tion of Richard Flemming, bishop of Lincoln as Bowet’s successor.97
Durham was also excluded, because the bishop (Thomas Langley)
already exercised full regalian jurisdiction within his bishopric. There
was a strong geographical correlation between diocese and county:
bishops were associated with those commissions which fell within, or
close to, the area of their diocesan control. Thus, the majority of coun-
ties whose commissions omitted bishops in 1424 (Bedfordshire, Leices-
tershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Rutland, and Yorkshire)
came under the purview of the vacant dioceses of York and Lincoln. It
93 O. Pike, ‘Common law and conscience in the ancient Court of Chancery’, Law Quarterly Review,
1 (1885), pp. 443–54; Vinogradoff, ‘Reason and conscience’, p. 379; Holdsworth, ‘Early history of
equity’, pp. 293–5; L. A. Knafla, ‘Conscience in the common law tradition’, University of Toronto
Law Journal, 26 (1976), pp. 1–16; Doe, Fundamental Authority, ch. 6.
94 CPR, 1422–1429, pp. 559–73. For brief consideration, see P. Heath, Church and Realm, 1272–
1461: Conflict and Collaboration in an Age of Crisis (London, 1988), pp. 320–1; and Swanson,
Church and Society, pp. 123–4.
95 CPR, 1416–22, p. 413. The counties affected were: Berkshire, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Hamp-
shire, Kent, Oxfordshire, Somerset and Sussex.
96 PROME, parliament of December 1421, items 2 and 4.
97 R. N. Swanson, ‘Flemming, Richard (d. 1431)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
online edn.
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is also interesting to note that the bishop of Durham was omitted from
the commission of peace for Northumberland, a county which provided
most of the territory for the diocese of Durham. This probably reflected
the regional sensitivities surrounding the powers of the bishops of
Durham and suggests, in particular, a desire of the crown to avoid
encouraging an extension of the bishop’s secular powers outside the
immediate area and jurisdiction of the palatinate.98 All the remaining
bishops were nominated to between one and three county commissions
each, except for Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester, who was nomi-
nated to no fewer than fourteen commissions. Beaufort’s predominance
in this instance, as well as in 1421, when his name appeared on all nine
of the peace commissions issued to the southern counties, strongly
suggests that he was the driving force behind the new policy. Beaufort
was a man of almost unparalleled influence in politics in these years
and, crucially, he was a key member of the royal council on both
occasions when the bishops became involved on the peace commis-
sions, for the first time in 1421 and then permanently in 1424. In 1424
he was not only de facto leader of the council, but also chancellor.99
It is thus difficult to imagine that the decision to incorporate bishops
on the peace commissions could have come from anyone other than
Beaufort.
His reasons for doing so also begin to become clear. Just as the
temporary strengthening of the peace commissions in 1421 seems to
have been done in response to the perceived threat of lawlessness caused
by Henry V’s prolonged absence abroad, it is likely that the decision in
1424 to extend the policy across the kingdom stemmed from similar
anxieties brought about by the minority of Henry VI and the complete
– and long-term – absence of royal oversight over the judicial system.
Additionally, the council might have been acting in the knowledge of
the duke of Gloucester’s planned expedition to the Low Counties in
October 1424, concerned that the absence of the Protector of the Realm
would result in increased levels of lawlessness and disorder.100 Such fears
will no doubt have supplemented general levels of anxiety about the
breakdown of the rule of law, for in the parliament which met in
October 1423, the Commons presented a number of petitions concern-
ing misdemeanours which they expected the justices of the peace to
address, including, notably, the enforcement of past labour legisla-
tion.101 A desire to strengthen the peace commissions in light of Glouc-
ester’s impending absence may thus have been complemented by
98 R. L. Storey, Thomas Langley and the Bishopric of Durham, 1406–1437 (London, 1961),
pp. 164–76; Liddy, Bishopric of Durham, pp. 17, 184–5, 208–9.
99 G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort: A Study of Lancastrian Ascendancy and Decline (Oxford,
1988), pp. 118–33.
100 Ibid., pp. 134–5, 145.
101 PROME, parliament of 1423, item 47 (expulsion of Irishmen from England); item 51 (weirs in
the Thames); item 53 (deceitful measures); item 56 (enforcement of the Statute of Labourers).
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increased levels of expectation vis-à-vis the peace commissions’ law-
enforcement duties.
The inclusion of prelates was in many ways a natural development of
changes that had occurred to the commissions in the second half of the
fourteenth century when the baronage and titled nobility were formally
integrated in peacekeeping activities.102 The involvement of men of such
high standing highlighted the contemporary presumption that a direct
link existed between the quality and effectiveness of the implementation
of justice, on the one hand, and the political and social status of the
justices, on the other. There is, however, no evidence that the prelates
actually sat and dispatched the routine business of the quarter sessions,
even though the commissions themselves were carefully framed to
exempt them from handling business inappropriate to their clerical
status.103 Like secular lords, their nomination was probably emblematic
of a desire to reinvigorate royal justice in the localities and indicated a
growing importance attached to this agency of law enforcement.104 In
one sense, of course, one might minimize the significance of this devel-
opment by arguing that the bishops, as the king’s tenants-in-chief, were
simply providing the service to the crown that was expected of them as
major landholders in the localities.105 But it is questionable whether the
basis of the bishops’ authority was considered to lie in their regional,
temporal power or whether in fact it was the moral and spiritual author-
ity invested in their high religious office, and their position as spiritual
peers of the realm, which really underpinned the prestige they brought
to the commissions. The year 1424 thus represented an important water-
shed. Symbolically, it marked the final and irrevocable breaking down
of the barrier that had hitherto limited prelates’ involvement in the
implementation of royal justice to the traditional discretionary courts of
parliament, council and chancery. From this point onwards senior
clerics were also, at least symbolically, engaged in regular common law
processes throughout the kingdom.
102 Summarized by A. Musson and W. M. Ormrod, The Evolution of English Justice: Law, Politics
and Society in the Fourteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 70–2. For more detailed discussion,
see S. Walker, ‘Yorkshire Justices of the Peace, 1389–1413’, English Historical Review, 108 (1993),
pp. 281–311, at pp. 284–9.
103 B. H. Putnam (ed.), Proceedings Before the Justices of the Peace in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Centuries, Edward III to Richard III (London, 1938), p. xxvii (and for an example of commission,
see pp. 257–62). I have checked gaol delivery rolls for the counties of Suffolk, Buckinghamshire,
Bedfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Devon, Dorset and Wiltshire in the first twenty years of Henry
VI’s reign (i.e. Just 3/65, 219, 224) and have discovered no clergymen who were active as justices of
the peace. The clerical members of peace commissions were, in any case, banned from involvement
in ‘matters of blood’, that is to say, cases of felony, counterfeiting and the prosecution of heretics
(i.e. after their handing over from the ecclesiastical courts).
104 See C. Carpenter, Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire landed Society, 1401–1499
(Cambridge, 1992), pp. 267–72. In addition to the appointment of bishops to the 1424 peace
commissions, some members of the high nobility, including the duke of Exeter and the earls of
Warwick and Stafford, were also nominated.
105 See Swanson, Church and Society, pp. 122–39.
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II
Understanding why bishops served the king as judges has been the
central task of this discussion. The aim has been to move away from the
more traditional and rather crude characterization of bishops who
entered royal service as merely career-minded pen-pushers with a pen-
chant for secular affairs, to a more nuanced appreciation of the theo-
retical and theological principles which underpinned these activities. In
2004 Benjamin Thompson described the late medieval church as an
institution ‘always facing two ways’, struggling to reconcile the irrecon-
cilable tension that existed between a desire for spiritual and vocational
separation from society, on the one hand, with an acknowledgement of
the importance of integration in society and government, on the other
hand.106 The one perspective asserted that God was best served when
the leaders of the church devoted themselves to ‘quiet ministry in the
diocese’; the other perspective asserted that the spiritual welfare of the
people was best served when the clergy were thoroughly immersed in
worldly affairs. The key point is that those bishops who chose the latter
route and who held public office or discharged key responsibilities in
government did not place themselves fundamentally at loggerheads with
church teaching or their own individual spiritual vocation – except
perhaps, that is, in the minds of the church reformers and critics.107
Dispensing justice lay at the very heart of the service bishops performed
both for the crown and for their spiritual flocks.
I have shown that prelates were especially central to the workings of
‘discretionary’ justice in the period, as core members of the committees of
parliamentary triers and the royal council, as chancellors spearheading
the development of chancery as a court of first instance, and as occasional
members of judicial inquiries in the localities. Many factors explain
why bishops were involved in these activities. What has perhaps been
underplayed, however, is the deep-seated canonical and theological
concepts which underpinned the judicial activities of these institutions
and which were themselves shaped and informed by the fundamental
precepts of natural law and natural justice. This is what made the council,
chancery and parliament the supreme courts of the land, because they
adhered more closely and explicitly than any other of the king’s courts to
the precepts of natural law. Natural law was akin to God’s law. The
spiritual and educational background of prelates thus made them the
obvious and ideal arbiters of natural justice in medieval society and
government. All this suggests that the characterization of bishops who
served the king in high office as ‘civil servants and statesmen rather than
106 Thompson, ‘Prelates and politics’, pp. 88–9.
107 See A. Hudson, ‘Hermofodrita or Ambidexter: Wycliffite views on clerks in secular office’, in
M. Aston and C. Richmond (ed.), Lollardy and the Gentry in the Later Middle Ages (Stroud, 1997),
pp. 41–51.
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ecclesiastics’108 may in fact draw too stark a distinction between secular
and religious affairs, and overlooks the fact that the spiritual vocation of
‘civil service’ bishops may to some extent have been fulfilled by their
office-holding duties. This is not to say that bishops might still have been
motivated by political or material considerations when serving the king.
My intention is to suggest that these factors were counterbalanced by,
and perhaps merged with, an ideological standpoint which made such
service entirely compatible with the bishop’s spiritual duties. Insofar as it
was an important expectation of a bishop that he should foster peace and
harmony amongst God’s people, there seemed every good reason why he
should engage in secular affairs.109 That at least, we might suspect, is how
bishops in royal service will have argued their case.
Whilst in the fourteenth century and earlier, the implementation of
natural justice was often conceived in terms of the application of the
critical faculty of ‘reason’, in the fifteenth century a shift in perspective
is indicated by the introduction of the term ‘conscience’ in legal and
political discourse. I have argued that this signalled a stronger associa-
tion of the workings of discretionary justice with theological and
canonical concepts, as well as a more clearly defined role for members of
the episcopate in providing judgments under the pretext of natural law
principles. The emergence of chancery as a discretionary court in its
own right, where senior clerics were now almost always appointed as
chancellors, greatly contributed to this new emphasis. The educational
background of fifteenth-century chancellors, many of whom held higher
degrees in canon or civil law, provided vital intellectual context for this
development. Indeed, the preponderance of men who had received uni-
versity training in law amongst the prelacy in general probably goes far
to explain why bishops willingly embraced a more prominent role in
legal matters during the fifteenth century.110 Jeremy Catto has suggested
that in this period a new emphasis on the moral underpinning of secular
politics and government was brought about by the influx of highly
educated clergy into the ‘councils of princes’. Because these clergy
were ‘disturbed by their involvement in the brutal world of politics and
worldly ambition’, Catto argues, a new conception of power and
authority based upon the concept of conscience emerged ‘to offer gradu-
ate careerists both self-respect and material comfort, [so they were]
gently guiding the caravan of state while grazing in the pastures of
the church’.111 In broad outline, this dynamic might hold true of the
108 Moorman, Church Life in England, p. 164.
109 A. Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1997), p. 289.
110 T. H. Aston, G. D. Duncan and T. A. R. Evans, ‘The medieval alumni of the university of
Cambridge’, Past & Present, 86 (1980), pp. 9–86, at p. 70.
111 J. Catto, ‘The burden and conscience of government in the fifteenth century’, Transactions of
the Royal Historical Society, 17 (2007), pp. 83–99, at pp. 87 and 89. Similar themes are touched on
in V. Gillespie, ‘Chichele’s church: vernacular theology in England after Thomas Arundel’, in V.
Gillespie and K. Ghosh (eds), After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England (Turn-
hout, 2011), pp. 3–42, esp. pp. 12–15, 19–20, where he suggests that under Chichele’s leadership the
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developing fifteenth-century chancery. By expressing the moral impera-
tive behind the proper and fair provision of natural justice, here was an
effective way of addressing those critics and reformers who argued for
the complete separation of the church and state. By sitting as a judge of
conscience, chancellors were not simply serving the king, they were
serving God and the church. As such, their service underlined the indi-
visibility of the church and state: natural law, and its derivative concepts
of reason, conscience and equity, provided a vital ideological bridge
between the two, allowing clergymen to legitimately serve both at the
same time. All this had the effect of thrusting fifteenth century chancel-
lors far more prominently than their fourteenth century predecessors
into the role of head of the judiciary, a point not lost on Richard, duke
of York, who declared to the chancellor, Thomas Bourchier, archbishop
of Canterbury in 1455 that ‘you are the head of justice in this land’.112 In
an age when the church had generally lost ground to the crown in terms
of its jurisdiction and influence, there was perhaps some comfort to be
gained by York’s acknowledgement that the laity were still subject to
the authority of a single clergyman.
These considerations are reinforced by the problematic nature of
secular government in the period. Apart from the brief interlude of
Henry V’s reign, for much of the fifteenth century England experienced
a prolonged period of troubled kingship, when the reigning monarch
was either incapacitated by youth or illness, or his authority was seri-
ously compromised by questionable claims to legitimacy and/or political
dissent. As we have seen, it was the vacuum of power at the centre
which initially prompted, and then sustained, the addition of prelates to
the commissions of the peace in the early years of Henry VI. Perhaps
also, it was no coincidence that in the same period chancellors began to
sermonize to the political community about the superiority of the
natural law and the obligation of everyone to adhere to its main tenets.
In other important contexts the natural law was similarly invoked as
part of a rhetorical agenda. In the early 1460s John Fortescue penned
De Natura Legis Naturae, a tract which explicitly affirmed the principle
that the power of the monarchy derived above all from the Law of
Nature.113 This had particular resonance at a time when the Lancastrian
monarchy could not count on the personal dynamism of the king to
generate feelings of loyalty and obedience in the population, so legiti-
macy and the right to rule became a matter of asserting the primacy of
English church underwent a process of spiritual reinvigoration which enabled it to rediscover its
confidence after years of doubt and turmoil induced by Lollardy and anti-clericalism at the end of
the fourteenth century.
112 PROME, parliament of 1455, item 19.
113 John Fortescue, The Works of Sir John Fortescue, ed. Lord Clemont (London, 1869), pp.
60–184; E. F. Jacob, ‘Sir John Fortescue and the law of nature’, Bulletin of the John Rylands
Library, 18 (1934), pp. 359–76; and E. F. Jacob, ‘Sir John Fortescue and the law of nature’, in
idem, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch (Manchester, 1953), pp. 106–20. De Natura was written before
1463 by Fortescue when he was in exile with Queen Margaret in Scotland.
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the Laws of Nature, which alone were said to be able to decide royal
succession.114 This went to the very heart of Fortescue’s theory of
dominion.115 From the perspective of fifteenth-century chancellors, it
was perhaps natural – in the absence of a strong monarch asserting
his position as the supreme source of justice and equity in the kingdom,
and also in view of a perception that the legal system was compromised
by the political interests it served – to shift the emphasis, so that the
obligation on the king’s subjects to behave in a law-abiding and obedi-
ent manner now became a matter of that individual’s relationship with
God. The legal system had always been underpinned by a strong moral
compass; the novelty was that in the fifteenth century this connection
became part of mainstream political dialogue and was used by chancel-
lors to persuade, and even cajole, the community of the realm into
accepting their obligation to ensure that peace and justice should
prevail.
114 This interpretation chimes nicely with the views recently expressed by Rosemarie McGerr on a
statute book commissioned for Prince Edward of Lancaster by Margaret of Anjou in c.1470. In her
view, the biblical iconography displayed in this work served to emphasize ‘the divine source for
Henry VI’s authority in the establishment and administration of earthly justice’ at a time when
there was no hiding the catastrophic weakness of his kingship: R. McGerr, A Lancastrian Mirror
for Princes: The Yale Law School ‘New Statutes of England’ (Bloomington, 2011), pp. 56–66
(quotation at p. 66).
115 S. B. Chrimes, ‘Sir John Fortescue and his theory of dominion’, Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, 4th ser., 17 (1934), pp. 117–47, esp. pp. 123–5, 134; P. E. Gill, ‘Politics and
propaganda in fifteenth-century England: the polemical writings of Sir John Fortescue’, Speculum,
46 (1971), pp. 333–47, at p. 339–42; J. H. Burns, ‘Fortescue and the political theory of dominium’,
The Historical Journal, 28 (1985), pp. 777–97, at pp. 786, 788–91.
240 REASON, CONSCIENCE AND EQUITY
© 2014 The Author. History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
